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Abstract 
The concept of corporate governance has emerged in the last century, but its significance and objectives are 
part of the recent phenomenon in most countries. The concept continues to be constantly adapting to the requirements 
of a modern economy under significant impact of globalization as a phenomenon overall. The subject of corporate 
governance is more relevant than ever at European and world level because multiple international organizations show 
intense concern in the field and focus their efforts towards globalization governance rules. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Now  days,  corporate  governance  and  related  practices  are  found  more  often  among  the  interest  areas  of 
research, representing extremely challenging topics.  
In the context of an extremely current issue, this paper brings to light a multilateral approach to the concept of 
corporate governance by reference to the globalization tendency of the governance norms. 
In  this approach, the paper starts with  various  conceptual approaches  on  governance  culture bringing into 
question the current state of knowledge, continues with the principles of corporate governance in relation to the specific 
literature and culminates with the comparative analysis of the three models of corporate governance: the traditional 
(Anglo-Saxon or American), the German and the Japanese model, in order to identify in the end the convergences and 
divergences  of  these  three  models  and  try  to  answer  to  the  research  question:  Will  the  globalization  lead  to  the 
convergence of different systems to outline a model of corporate governance applicable worldwide? 
This work is part of an extended research which will form part of the doctoral thesis called „The accounting and 
financial management of public higher education institutions”. 
 
2. Conceptual Approaches on Corporate Governance 
 
  In essence, the concept of governance and the practices related to it assign a management process in which all 
parties work together to carry out their assumed missions. 
Leading researchers of Romania define corporate governance as “a set of rules through which companies are 
managed and supervised by the Board of Directors, in order to protect the interests of all the parties.” [1] 
Starting  from  the  fact  that  corporate  governance  is  a  stimulation  mechanism  for  economic  and  social 
development at a global level, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD abbreviated) 
became one of the promoters of this concept. OECD defines corporate governance as a multifaceted concept that 
engages: [2] 
•  a set of relationships between the head of a company, its Board, its shareholders and other stakeholders; 
•  the structure through which the company objectives are set, including the way to achieve them and to measure 
the performances;  
•  the proper incentive system for the Board and the management for tracking and achieving objectives that are in 
the companies and in the shareholders interest and to monitor the efficient use of resources. 
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3. Corporate Governance Principles 
 
A good corporate governance is built on precise rules, relevant management procedures and control policies, 
whose engagement is to bring added value to organizations and to guarantee them an effective funding. In the absence 
of such rules and policies and without a proper governance strategy, organizations are exposed to significant risks, 
especially financial risks, most often getting to confront with the effects associated to negative perceptions of the 
present and potential investors. 
As Spătăcean and Ghiorghiţă assess "corporate governance principles represent the scaffolding on which the 
relationships between public entities and holders of financial or non-financial interests are built." [3] 
In general, a good governance works by following the next eight principles [4]: 
1.  Transparency - which assumes the availability of information and free access to them for those who are 
affected by organizational decisions implemented. Transparency is particularly important for external users 
who do not have access to "behind the scenes details" as in the case of internal users. Transparency is therefore 
a form of accountability of the organization for the external effects caused by its actions, resulting an equitable 
dissemination of information to all stakeholders. 
2.  The rule of law  -  a principle which refers to the regulatory framework under the auspices on which the 
organization operates, essentially being that the rules are applied impartially and without exception. 
3.  Participation -   it refers to the involvement in the organizational governance of all stakeholders either directly 
or through intermediaries or representatives, respecting the freedom of expression and association. 
4.  Prompt reaction - involves providing assistance to all stakeholders within a reasonable timeframe. 
5.  Equity - aimed at providing insurance to confirm that the opinions of all stakeholders are taken into account in 
decision-making, without discrimination. 
6.  Efficiency and effectiveness - efficiency requires minimizing costs of the actions, while effectiveness involves 
obtaining results that meet organizational needs as a result of making the best use of available resources. 
7.  Sustainability - refers to the effect of present actions on future options by the fact that the resources currently 
used  may  not  be  available  in  the  future,  which  is  why  it  is  recommended  as  long  as  possible  the  use  of 
renewable resources with a minimum effect on the environment. 
8.  Responsibility – implies admitting that the organization operates in a complex external environment to which 
is responsible, in the sense of reaching a broad consensus of all parties affected by organizational decisions and 
actions. 
 
Picture no. 1 – Presentation of the principles for a good governance and  
the principles of corporate governance in the vision of Crowther and Seifi  
Source: Own processing after Crowther D, Saifi S (2011)  
Corporate Governance and International Business, Ventus Publishing ApS. p. 29. 
 
As it can be observed in Picture no. 1, from these general principles were developed the principles of corporate 
governance  which  in  the  vision  of  Crowther  and  Seifi  represent:  transparency,  accountability,  responsibility  and 
fairness. [5] 
•  Transparency - refers to disseminating information in terms of efficiency, equality of access and promtness. 
•  Accountability  -  refers  to  the  organizational  obligation  to  be  accountable  to  stakeholders,  particularly 
regulatory institutions, supervisors and the community that the organization serves.  
•  Responsibility – it is closely linked to the concepts of corporate social responsibility and business ethics.  
•  Fairness - refers to the fair presentation of information and fair treatment in relation to the actors who have 
interest in the company, respectively the shareholders and the stakeholders. 
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Shareholders are those who have a financial share in the company, more precise its owners. As such, their 
primary interest is a financial one. Instead, stakeholders include other categories of interested parties, excepting the 
owners,  namely  employees,  state  institutions,  partners,  credit  institutions,  the  community.  Shareholders are thus  a 
broader category because their interests may be of another nature than purely financial, namely: economic, social, 
political. 
In this investigative approach it is essential to mention the OECD Principles of Corporate Governance, adopted 
in 1999, which became a landmark of global benchmark for the corporate governance reform, with the purpose to assist 
governments in assessing and systematic improving of the institutional and regulatory corporate governance in their 
countries. Subsequently, the initially adopted principles were revised after extensive consultations with experts from 
several  countries  (both  OECD  countries  and  non-members)  who  participated  in  the  roundtable  on  corporate 
governance, and consultations with a wide range of stakeholders (the business sector, investors, trade associations, 
trade unions, international standardization bodies), thus taking into account new trends. Therefore, the final set of 
principles issued by the OECD include: transparency and efficiency of markets, compliance with the rule of law, 
protect  the  rights  of  the  owners,  fair  treatment  of  all  shareholders,  recognizing  the  interests  of  all  stakeholders, 
transparency and information and assuming the accountability by the Board of Directors. [6] 
Although the revised principles have gained the status of reference pillars because they combine extensive 
experience not only from OECD, but also from non-member countries, they are not binding and can be implemented by 
adapting to different economic and cultural circumstances. 
 
4. Corporate governance models 
 
Related  to  the  economic,  financial,  political,  social  or  cultural  peculiarities  of  each  state,  the  corporate 
governance systems have certain characteristics and key elements that distinguish them from one country to another. 
Over time, various authors have attempted to classify systems of corporate governance, but their efforts to 
pinpoint the classification categories for these systems (with the peculiarities of a country) have been compared by 
other authors with the failed attempts of stepsisters of Cinderella to try on her shoe. [7] 
We believe that one cannot simply select a model to apply it in a given country because the structure of 
corporate governance in each state develops in relation to the factors and conditions within this state, the process 
being a dynamic one. However, we believe that some classifications can be useful to researchers in their efforts, 
especially as a basis for further development of the theme treated. 
In this case, corporate governance systems can be classified according to the criterion of "insider-outsider". [8] 
Insiders are employees of the corporation or people who have significant business and personal relationships with the 
management of the companies. In return, outsiders are individuals or institutions "outside" the corporation, which have 
no direct relationship or management relationship with it. 
The  insider  type  of  corporate  governance  systems  are  characterized  by  a  small  number  or  a  group  of 
majority shareholders controlling listed companies. These systems are therefore based on the strong relations of the 
corporation with its shareholders, which can be both strength and weakness. The strength is based on the convergence 
of interest between managers (leaders) and shareholders, while weakness occurs due to possible abuses that may occur 
as  a  result  of  the  concentration  of  power,  therefore,  minority  shareholders  may  face  an  impediment  in  obtaining 
information related to corporate actions as a result of the lack of transparency of the system. 
On the other hand, the outsider type of corporate governance systems are those in which corporations are 
owned by outsiders or external shareholders (individual shareholders or institutional investors), but are controlled by 
managers. This separation of ownership and control has led to the development of “the agent theory” according to 
which  managers  have  control  over  other  people's  capital.  The  more  the  property  is  de-concentrated,  the  more  it 
separates the ownership of the control and the issues are amplified.  
In countries with advanced economies there are two models of corporate governance: the shareholder model 
in which the aim is maximizing shareholder value and the stakeholder model that aims to protect the interests of all 
parties involved in the life of the company (shareholders, managers, employees, trading partners). In the following, we 
will focus on corporate governance in well developed countries, analyzing three significant models: the traditional 
(Anglo-Saxon or Anglo-American), the German and the Japanese model. 
The traditional model (Anglo-Saxon or American) is a shareholder-type model (with focus on shareholders) 
of governing corporations in the UK, USA, Australia, Canada, New Zealand and several other countries. 
According to this model, developed in the context of market economy, the corporation has as objective to 
maximize the present value for the investors (shareholders), with focus on outsiders. Regarding this aspect, the United 
States and the United Kingdom are known to have the  tendency to include more outsiders rather than insiders in 
corporate governance structures to prevent the abuses that can occur due to the concentration of power (for example, a 
Board of Directors firmly controlled by a person who serves as both chairman of the Board and as CEO, a Board of 
Directors composed exclusively of  "insiders" seeking to maintain power for a longer period of time, without taking 
into account the interests of other actors).  However, in these states we begin to meet more often the tendency to 
substantially influence the management of the companies. Thus, outsiders become insiders as institutional shareholders 
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get to hold majority shares in a corporation and exert a strong influence on the management, taking over the role of 
insider majority. 
The model is based on a well developed regulatory framework which states rights and responsibilities, and 
relationships between the key players that make up the triangle of corporate governance, namely: managers, directors 
and shareholders. 
Being an outsider type model, the traditional model is characterized by the fact that investors contribute with 
capital to maintain ownership in the corporation, but they generally avoid to assume legal liability for the companies 
measures, reason for which they transfer the management control through payment of leaders who act as their agents. 
The costs of this separation of ownership and control are called "agency costs". The problem, however in this case is 
the fact that the interests of shareholders and managers do not always correspond. To reconcile this conflict most often 
a Board of Directors is elected by the shareholders to keep an eye on the management on behalf and in their interest. 
Board  of  Directors,  thus  provides  two  functions:  the  management  of  work  -  carried  out  by  insiders  (executive 
management in which the supreme authority is the CEO) and the oversight and control - performed by outsiders 
(appointed non-executive directors in the British system).  
Also, referring to the traditional model we should not forget that stock markets play an important role in 
establishing  the  listing  and  information  requirements.  The  publishing  requirements  are  high,  but  nowhere  else  so 
stringent and comprehensive as in the United States. These include: corporate financial data, a breakdown of the capital 
structure,  substantial  information  regarding  each  candidate  for  Board,  information  on  mergers  and  restructuring, 
proposed amendments to the articles of association, etc. The disclosure requirements in the UK and other countries 
following the Anglo-American model are similar, except that it requires less data in several categories. 
In  terms  of  corporate  actions  requiring  shareholder  approval,  we  mention  that  they  are  divided  into  two 
categories: routine actions and non - routine actions. Routine actions that require shareholder approval include the 
election of directors and the selection of auditors. Non-routine actions that also require the approval of shareholders 
relate to: mergers and acquisitions, restructuring and modification of association. 
Between the American system and the British one there is still an important distinction. The United States 
shareholders are not entitled to vote on the dividend proposed by the Board of Directors, while the UK shareholders 
exercising voting on the proposed dividend. 
Regarding the exercise of voting rights is important to note that the traditional model allows proxy voting 
without shareholders to attend at the General Assembly. All shareholders receive in advance via e-mail the agenda of 
the meeting, including information on all the proposals, the annual report of the corporation, and a voting card. Voting 
by proxy voting card involves completing and returning it to the corporation by e- mail. By doing so, the shareholders 
authorize the Board of Directors Chairman to consider votes as indicated on the voting cards. Also, shareholders may 
submit proposals concerning the business of the corporation for inclusion on the agenda of the General Meeting of 
Shareholders. 
The German model of corporate governance is an original model that distinguishes from other models by the 
existence of very strong shareholders: the credit institutions. In this case, we are dealing with the significant influence 
of capital markets and stock exchanges, but a model with a focus on insiders - major stakeholders involved in the 
management and control of corporations. 
Credit  institutions  participate  actively  in  the  recovery  of  distressed  companies  by  increasing  their  capital 
holdings. The management of these portfolios must be made considering the responsibility the banks have towards their 
clients, namely assuring their economies safety. The collaboration between credit institutions and corporations has the 
effect of reducing information asymmetry, leading ultimately to facilitating the access to bank capital. 
In this case, we are not dealing with a "one tier"   corporate structure (on one level) as in the Anglo-American 
model, but with a structure of  " two tier" (two levels) in which differs Board (the so-called vorstand) with the attributes 
of leadership and corporate business management and Supervisory Board (the so called aufsichtstrat) responsible for 
the  supervision  of  management,  selection,  appointment  and  dismissal  of  leaders  contracting  audit  services,  the 
appointment of Board members. 
Another  particular  feature  of  the  German  model  of  corporate  governance  is  the  principle  of  social  co-
determination which is explained by the presence of the employee representatives in the Supervisory Board, which 
gives them some power of control over the management, but also the right to take part in the decision-making process. 
Thus, we can easily see the central role that the system assigns to the human resource and the intense concern to meet 
the interests of employees by considering their opinion. 
Therefore, the German model is a model of social consensus that encourages a co - manager mechanism, a 
participatory management and decision-making process with a strong democratic, helping to augment productivity and 
to reduce the various risks to which the corporations are subject to. 
The Japanese model of corporate governance is characterized by the ownership of shares in the corporations 
by credit institutions and by companies. As in the case of the German model, we can notice in our research approach a 
model in which credit institutions are strongly related to corporations. 
The Japanese economy is dominated by the so-called “keiretsu” - companies that are grouped under a lending 
credit institution that funds them, and which are working towards a mutual benefit. “At the basis of Keiretsu are usually 
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a bank and a foreign trade enterprise. Among other things, the banks, through their experts have a big influence in 
investment projects through the feasibility studies that they do and by providing soft loans when necessary. These 
financial institutions accept even the probability of smaller profits and dividends, given the long-term success of their 
investments. Even if Keiretsu pay lower dividends to shareholders, the tendency is to recapitalize profits by investing in 
advanced equipment, research, development and acquisition of new properties, which in time will reward the initial 
sacrifices." [9] In turn, foreign trade enterprises are responsible for the dissolution of a wide range of products by the 
use of a large network of connections with global coverage. 
A key feature of keiretsu practice is the cross- holding of shares between the group companies, in order to 
prevent the acquisition of a controlling interest and the control of the group by foreign companies. 
Keiretsu  system  is  characterized  by  a  strong  unity  through  personal  and  business  relationships  that  are 
extremely strong and durable. Firstly, the employees show a great commitment to the group and have the tendency to 
remain  faithful  throughout  their  working  lives.  Typically,  in  case  of  business  setback,  dismissals  are  avoided  by 
directing employees to more prosperous areas of the system. Secondly, solid business relationships inevitably lead to 
true personal relationships based on mutual trust between the group and the trading partners. However, in time, the 
Japanese distribution system has been criticized, regarding the ”Itten itchoai” system that restricts the relationships 
between retailers and wholesalers, with negative effects on competition. 
However,  in  the  context  of  globalization,  the  keiretsu  trend  of  conserving  the  alliance  groups  decreased 
considerably,  so  that  they  have  expressed  openness  to  embark  on  business  in  partnership  with  various  foreign 
companies showing exemplary flexibility in adapting to progress, and to overcome the difficulties that have tried them 
in 2011. 
 
5. Results and Discussion 
 
A comparative analysis of the three models of corporate governance, represented schematically in Picture no. 
2 highlights a series of elements of convergence as well as many distinctive features of the systems investigated in our 
research approach. 
 
 
Picture no. 2 - Comparative analysis of corporate governance models 
Source: Own processing after Dobrotă C., Cocean R., Bogdan A., Bucur I., Bălăceanu C.,  
Dobre E., Agachi P., Herbil M., Guvernanţă universitară (Îmbunătăţirea Managementului Universitar),  
UEFISCDI, Bucureşti, 2011, p. 22 [10] 
 
We  notice  that  the  Anglo-American  model  centers  on  the  capital  market  around  which  gravitates  a  large 
number  of  listed  corporations.  Instead,  the  role  of  the  credit  institutions  is  limited  compared  to  the  German  and 
Japanese models which are centered on the banking market in terms of funding and relating to participation and to the 
exercise of control in the process of governance. 
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In  addition,  characteristic  to  the  United  States  and  Great  Britain  is  the  shareholder  type  of  corporate 
governance, with a focus on maximizing profits to shareholders, while in Germany and Japan we meet the stakeholder 
type models, with focus on the interests of all the parties involved.  
Regarding  the  ownership  structures,  in  countries  pioneer  in  corporate  governance  we  meet  a  dispersed 
ownership, a diffuse ownership, which does not allow any notable control over the corporation, this latter task being 
entrusted to managers. On the other hand, in Germany and Japan the shareholder structure and hence the ownership and 
control are concentrated.   
In the Anglo-American model the governance is ensured through the fundamental body, the Board of Directors 
(Board), composed of executives and non -executive directors (in the UK) or outside- directors (the United States). The 
German model governance is provided by the Vorstand (Board of Directors) - responsible for the management and 
leadership and the aufsichtstrat (Supervisory Board) - with control. In the Japanese model, the Board structure attaches 
great importance to the position of interested parties (stakeholders).  
The models of German and Japanese corporate governance are based on internal control mechanisms justified 
by the existence of strong shareholders such as credit institutions, while the Anglo -American model is based on 
external control mechanisms under a significant influence of the capital markets. 
In terms of mobility of the employees, in the Anglo -Saxon countries we encounter an extremely flexible labor 
market,  which  allows  easy  transfer  from  one  job  to  another.  In  contrast,  in  Germany  and  in  Japan  we  notice  a 
conservative trend, with a rigid labor market which makes the mobility for the employees  dificult, an aspect justified 
by the significant investment  that employers directs toward  staff training, thus acquiring skills in a particular job, and 
a special attachment toward the company. 
From the analysis we can observe many similarities between the German and Japanese models, and especially 
between the British system of corporate governance and the American system, but also defining feature for each model. 
                                                                                                                                      
6. Conclusion 
 
In time, globalization has diminished the differences regarding the implementation of corporate governance in 
emerging  economies  compared  to  advanced  economies.  However,  we  are  still  far  from  talking  about  a  holistic 
approach,  taking  into  account  the  particularities  of  each  country,  and  especially  the  differences  between  the  two 
categories. 
However at this stage we are asking a resonable question: "Will the globalization lead to the convergence of the 
different systems to outline a model of corporate governance applicable worldwide?" 
We believe that although it is now possible to identify a number of common elements between the different 
models  of  corporate  governance,  there  can  be  no  further  references  of  a  foreseeable  future  to  shape  a  corporate 
governance model perfectly balanced with uniform application worldwide, because the socio-economic and cultural 
differences between countries, and due to the uncertaincy of the period we are going through. 
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